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ABSTRACT 
Reports of how some bystanders interact with victims on the scene of an emergency 
are shocking. Instead of assisting or calling for help, these individuals take pictures 
or recordings of the victims on their cell phones. This Article concentrates on the 
question of whether such an interaction with a victim might in certain circumstances 
constitute a distinct and legally actionable harm. This Article proposes a new tort: 
exploitative objectification of a person in need of emergency assistance. It works to 
articulate the moral and legal foundations for an argument that treating a person in 
need of emergency assistance as an object of amusement should be considered a 
legally cognizable harm. Cognizant of concerns about over-breadth and moral 
overload, it clearly distinguishes between those who cross the line of engaging the 
scene and the victim (“engaged spectators”) and those who do not (“pure 
bystanders”). It argues for ample space for discretion in the decision whether to 
engage, respecting subjective assessments of risks and priorities as grounded in the 
emotional and interior life of the bystander. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
or many law students, the discussion of the common law no-duty 
to rescue is almost a rite of passage. At some point in the first-year 
torts curriculum, the discussion presents itself as a kind of marker of 
whether or not they have entered into the realm of “thinking like a 
lawyer.” The problem of “easy” rescue, understood as a bystander’s 
response to an emergency situation that would impose no or miniscule 
risk to the bystander, lends itself to shocking hypothetical fact patterns. 
For example, a two-year old child is drowning in a wading pool, 
and a passerby, with no danger to herself, could easily pull the child 
out of the water. Does the passerby have any legal duty to help? 
Consider an example from the second Restatement of Torts: “A sees B, 
a blind man, about to step into the street in front of an approaching 
automobile. A could prevent B from so doing by a word or touch 
without delaying his own progress.”
1
 Does A have any legal duty to 
prevent B from stepping into the street? 
In almost all jurisdictions in the United States, the answer is no.
2
 
When A does not alert B to the approaching automobile, and B is 
subsequently run over and hurt, A is not liable to B because A is under 
no legal duty to prevent B from stepping into the street.
3
 And the 
drowning person? As leading torts commentator William Prosser 
graphically described, even an expert swimmer, rope in hand, “who 
sees another drowning before his eyes, is not required to do anything 




Discussions may also include the case of Kitty Genovese, brutally 
attacked and stabbed to death in her quiet middle-class Queens, New 
York neighborhood. As the story goes, at least thirty-eight neighbors 
heard her screams as she lay bleeding, and the police did not receive 
their first call until half an hour after the attack.
5
 Debates frequently 
                                                          
1
 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314 cmt. c, illus. 1 (Am. Law Inst. 1965). 
2
 As discussed infra, at note 7, a few states have amended their penal codes to 
include a statutory duty to rescue. 
3
 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314 cmt. c, illus. 1 (Am. Law Inst. 1965). 
4
 William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 340 (4th ed. 1971). 
5
 Martin Gansberg, 37 Who Saw Murder Didn’t Call Police, N.Y. TIMES, March 
27, 1964, http://www.nytimes.com/1964/03/27/37-who-saw-murder-didnt-call-
the-police.html [https://perma.cc/F6UY-AGNQ] (the Author notes the 
inconsistency in the title of this article); see also Charles Mohr, Apathy is Puzzle 
 
F 
2017 Crime Spectators and the Tort of Objectification 71 
focus on the action or inaction of one or more bystanders in relation to 
the primary injury: what should A have done to try to save B from the 
peril, or at least to mitigate the harm? In the Genovese case of a crowd, 
how might one determine which A should have done something? 
The focus of this Article is different. Considering the reaction of A 
to the violence, it queries whether A’s response to the injury of 
violence constitutes a distinct harm to B. If instead of alerting B to the 
danger, A takes a cell phone picture of B stepping into the street—
might that be a distinct, and legally cognizable harm? 
II. SEINFELD’S GUIDE TO BYSTANDER OBLIGATIONS 
To illustrate this distinction, this Part turns first to a venerable 
guide to U.S. law and culture: the Seinfeld television series, and 
specifically to the well-known “Finale” of May 1998.
6
 As noted above, 
the common law has been reluctant to impose legal sanctions on 
bystanders for failure to assist in an emergency, but some states have 
experimented with criminal statutes.
7
 The Seinfeld “Finale” is perhaps 
one of the most interesting cultural commentaries on these efforts. 
                                                                                                                                         
in Queens Killing, N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1964, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1964/03/28/apathy-is-puzzle-in-queen-skilling.html 
[https://perma.cc/D9KN-W7WF]; Abraham M. Rosenthal, Thirty-Eight 
Witnesses (1964). 
6
 Seinfeld: Finale (NBC television broadcast May 14, 1998), http://seinfeld-
episode.blogspot.com/2013/07/the-finale.html [https://perma.cc/Z43C-QZTB]; 
see also Seinfeld Scripts, The Finale, 
http://www.seinfeldscripts.com/TheFinale.htm [https://perma.cc/4LC2-385G] 
(last visited Oct. 11, 2016). 
7
 See, e.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. 640A.01(1) (West 1996) (requiring reasonable 
assistance at the scene of an emergency); R.I. Gen. Laws 11-56-1 (1994) (same); 
Vt. Stat. Ann., tit. 12, § 519(a) (1973) (“A person who knows that another is 
exposed to grave physical harm shall, to the extent that the same can be rendered 
without danger or peril to himself or without interference with important duties 
owed to others, give reasonable assistance to the exposed person unless that 
assistance or care is being provided by others.”). In Massachusetts, bystanders 
are not required to provide assistance, but are required to report violent or sexual 
crimes to which they are a witness. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 268, § 40 (West 
1990) (“Whoever knows that another person is a victim of aggravated rape, 
murder, manslaughter or armed robbery and is at the scene of said crime shall, to 
the extent that said person can do so without danger or peril to himself or others, 
report said crime to an appropriate law enforcement official as soon as 
reasonably practicable.”). Similar statutes have been enacted in Florida, Hawaii, 
Washington, and Wisconsin. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 794.027 (West 1992); Hawaii 
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The four main characters in the series—hard-bitten cynical and 
sarcastic New Yorkers Jerry, George, Elaine, and Kramer—find 
themselves in the fictional small town of Latham, Massachusetts, 
awaiting repairs on a plane that had made a safe emergency landing. 
While paused on the sidewalk, the group looks across the street and 
sees an assailant holding up an overweight man at gun point, then 
taking his wallet and stealing his car. 
Kramer, video-camera in hand, says, “I want to capture this,” and 
films the event, which also records audio of the other three observers 
making wise-cracks about the incident and about the victim’s weight.
8
 
After making a sarcastic comment, Jerry proceeds to place a call on his 
mobile phone—not to report the robbery, but to check in on the 
progress of the plane repairs. When a police officer appears on the 
scene, the crime victim gestures towards the four witnesses. They are 
arrested for a violation of a recently enacted “Good Samaritan Law,” 
which, as the officer explained, “requires you to help or assist anyone 
in danger as long as it’s reasonable to do so.”
9
 They are taken to a 
holding cell at the local jail. 
                                                                                                                                         
Rev. Stat. § 663-1.6 (1993); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9.69.100 (West 1998); 
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 940.34 (West 1996). California imposes a duty to report when 
the victim is a child. Cal. Penal Code § 152.3 (West 2016). Ohio imposes a 
general duty to report a felony. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2921.22 (West 1997); 
see also Restatement (Third) of Torts § 38 (Am. Law Inst. 2011) (“When a 
statute requires an actor to act for the protection of another, the court may rely 
on the statute to decide that an affirmative duty exists and to determine the scope 
of the duty.”); see generally Eugene Volokh, Duty to Rescue / Report Statues 
(Nov. 3, 2009), http://www.volokh.com/2009/11/03/duty-to-rescuereport-
statutes [https://perma.cc/J2M8-ZRSR]. 
8
 See, e.g., Finale Script, supra note 6 (Jerry: “Well, there goes the money for the 
lipo!” | Elaine: “See, the great thing about robbing a fat guy is it’s an easy 
getaway. You know? They can’t really chase ya!” | George: “He’s actually 
doing him a favor. It’s less money for him to buy food.”). 
9
 From their jail cell they glean more information: “Elaine: The Good Samaritan 
Law? Are they crazy? | George: Why would we want to help somebody? | 
Elaine: I know. | George: That’s what nuns and Red Cross workers are for. | 
Kramer: The Samaritans were an ancient tribe - very helpful to people. | Elaine: 
Alright – um, excuse me, hi, could you tell me what kind of law this is. | Deputy: 
Well, they just passed it last year. It’s modeled after the French law. I heard 
about it after Princess Diana was killed and all those photographers were just 
standing around. . . . Deputy: You’re the first ones to be arrested on it, probably 
in the whole country. | George: All right, so what’s the penalty here? Let’s just 
pay the fine or something and get the hell out of here. | Deputy: Well, it’s not 
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When they call to retain an attorney, Jackie Chiles (a parody of 
Johnnie Cochran), exclaims, “Good Samaritan Law? I never heard of 
it. You don’t have to help anybody. That’s what this country’s all 
about. That’s deplorable, unfathomable, improbable.”
10
 
A. Legal Accountability for “Mocking and Maligning”? 
Because this was the first trial of its kind, the extremely zealous 
Seinfeld prosecutor digs up every bit of character evidence to show 
that the attitude of the four bystanders in this instance was simply a 
manifestation of a lifetime of “criminal indifference.”
11
 The opening 
statement for the prosecution captures well the moral outrage that 
seems to drive many proposals for enforcing a legal duty to rescue: 
Hoyt: Ladies and gentlemen, last year, our City 
Council, by a vote of twelve to two, passed a Good 
Samaritan Law. Now, essentially, we made it a crime to 
ignore a fellow human being in trouble. Now this group 
from New York not only ignored, but, as we will prove, 
they actually mocked the victim as he was being robbed 
at gunpoint. 
I can guarantee you one other thing, ladies and 
gentlemen, this is not the first time they have behaved in 
this manner. On the contrary, they have quite a record 
of mocking and maligning. This is a history of 
selfishness, self-absorption, immaturity, and greed. 
And you will see how everyone who has come into 
contact with these four individuals has been abused, 
wronged, deceived and betrayed. This time, they have 
gone too far. This time they are going to be held 




                                                                                                                                         
that easy. Now see, the law calls for a maximum fine of $85,000 and as much as 




 Fortunately for Seinfeld fans, the episode’s portrayal through trial witnesses of 
vignettes of sarcasm, often at the expense of others, is also a humorous walk 
down the series’ memory lane. 
12
 Finale Script, supra note 6. 
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The prosecutor’s statement builds on a kind of gut moral instinct 
that people should be held “accountable” for their “mocking and 
maligning,” especially when it reflects a deeper pattern of “selfishness, 
self-absorption, immaturity, and greed.” Particularly, when such 
conduct results in others being “abused, wronged, deceived and 
betrayed,” many are ready to entertain the idea that the behavior rises 
to the level of public censure and legal sanction.
13
 
Note the large gap between the Seinfeld statute under which the 
four characters were charged and the driving force of the prosecutor’s 
opening statement. As the officer explained, the four were arrested for 
violation of a recently enacted law that would require them “to help or 
assist anyone in danger as long as it’s reasonable to do so.” The statute 
did not delineate a duty to “rescue” in the sense that it required 
physical intervention, or some other direct interruption of the causal 
chain of events that led to the initial harm. Remember that in this case 
the assailant was armed, while the victim and the four witnesses were 
unarmed. “Reasonable” action under the circumstances would have 
had to account for these risks. 
The prosecutor’s opening statement takes the case in a very 
different direction. It does not focus on the witnesses’ failure to 
intervene or to call for help. Instead, there is a clear tension between 
his description of the law—”Now essentially, we made it a crime to 
ignore a fellow human being in trouble”—and the driving force of his 
argument against the four: not that they had ignored the victim, but the 
opposite, namely that they inflicted a distinct harm, “they actually 
mocked the victim as he was being robbed at gunpoint.”
14
 The conduct 
that was on trial in the Finale was not so much an attitude of 
indifference, but that they had inflicted distinct harms, corroborated by 
character evidence of how they had inflicted similar harms on other 
vulnerable people. Thus the prosecutor’s case consisted in presenting a 
record of “mocking and maligning” grounded in a “history of 
                                                          
13
 See id. The sentencing scene: “[Judge] Vandelay: Will the defendants please 
rise. And how do you find, with respect to the charge of criminal indifference? | 
Foreman: We find the defendants - guilty. | Vandelay: Order! Order in this court, 
I will clear this room! I do not know how, or under what circumstances the four 
of you found each other, but your callous indifference and utter disregard for 
everything that is good and decent has rocked the very foundation upon which 
our society is built. I can think of nothing more fitting than for the four of you to 
spend a year removed from society so that you can contemplate the manner in 
which you have conducted yourselves.” 
14
 Id. 
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selfishness, self-absorption, immaturity, and greed,” with the resulting 
damage that “everyone who ha[d] come into contact with [the] four 
individuals ha[d] been abused, wronged, deceived and betrayed.”
15
 
Focusing on the gap between the Seinfeld statute and the 
prosecutor’s argument, the eye is drawn not to the failure to help per 
se, but the aspect of a bystander’s conduct that may constitute 
“mocking and maligning.” When a bystander stops to focus on the 
scene of an accident or assault, notices that the victim is in need of 
emergency assistance, and engages in conduct that expresses 
disrespect for the humanity of the victim and this person’s particular 
need for assistance, this is not doing nothing. Thus one might query: 
might the law recognize that at some point these expressions of 
“selfishness and self-absorption” do constitute a kind of abuse—a 
wrong—that should have a civil remedy in law? 
Concerns about a particular form of “mocking and maligning” 
have crystallized with the pervasive presence of recording devices 
such as cell phones. Like Kramer with his video-camera in the Finale 
scene, those who take cell phone pictures are hardly ignoring the 
victim or doing nothing. Rather, they are engaging the attack by 
focusing on it, and filming or photographing it. Such conduct 
objectifies and exploits another human being precisely at a moment in 
which this person is vulnerable. In many situations, this objectification 
and exploitation is exacerbated by subsequently posting the 
photograph or video recording on social media. 
B. The Prevalence of “Mocking and Maligning” Today 
Consider a recent incident of a man beaten up outside of New York 
City’s Port Authority Bus Terminal. In the early morning hours of 
March 31, 2014, Jose Robles (“Robles”) took a bus from New Jersey 
to the main bus depot in Manhattan, as part of his regular commute to 
his job as a manager of the Carnegie Deli on 57th Street. At about 5:45 
a.m., as he tried to hail a cab outside of the bus terminal, an assailant 
approached him from behind. Robles recounted: “All of a sudden this 
guy got in front of me and dove at me. He hit me in the eye and I went 
down.”
16
 As the attacker started to kick him, he struggled to his feet to 
try to fight him off, but his left arm had been shattered. Robles 
recounted, “He wouldn’t stop. I tried to get up again, but he grabbed 
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my jacket and spun me around and he grabbed my shoes and threw 
them in the street and started kicking me again.”
17
 
The near-dawn street was not deserted; a number of bystanders 
were watching the incident unfold—some from behind their cell 
phones. As Robles described the scene: “People were watching and 
they were having a good time filming.”
18
 Dismayed that no one tried 
to assist or shout for help, he managed to pull out his own cell phone 
and call the police. As he dialed 9-1-1, the assailant yelled, “That’s my 
phone”—which Robles surmised was an effort to trick onlookers into 
believing the assailant was the victim.
19
 “I called for help, but people 
were just filming on their cell phones. I ran into the Port Authority and 
cops were coming down the escalator.”
20
 The assailant followed 
Robles inside the terminal and hid when he saw the police. Robles 
identified the assailant, who was subsequently arrested.
21
 
Interviewed from his hospital bed, Robles reflected that while the 
attack was bad enough, the behavior of witnesses was worse: “I want 
people to have a little more conscience.”
22
 As one headline mused, 
“Deli Manager Mercilessly Beaten as NYC Onlookers Just Stare”—a 
“Modern Day Kitty Genovese?”
23
 
                                                          
17
 Kerry Burke, Tina Moore & Bill Hutchinson, Port Authority Attack Victim Says 
Bystanders Snapped Photos Instead of Calling for Help, N.Y. Daily News (Apr. 
1, 2014), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nyc-crime/port-authority-
attack-victim-angry-do-nothing-witnesses-article-1.1742519 
[https://perma.cc/YUB6-DSAH]. Other coverage insures that this was not an 
April Fool Day story. See, e.g., Aaron Feis, Carnegie Deli Manager Attacked by 














 See Modern Day Kitty Genovese? Deli Manager Mercilessly Beaten in NYC as 
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Robles was certainly not alone in registering his dismay for how 
bystanders respond to violence.
24
 One might, in some sense, 
understand how mental instability or extreme circumstances may have 
led the assailant, a homeless man, to snap into a violent rage. Robles’s 
real rage seems to be reserved for what he sensed was callous 
indifference on the part of the bystanders who, from the other side of 
their phones, appeared oblivious to his trauma. Instead, they turned his 
urgent need for assistance into a spectacle, as if it were simply a scene 
in a movie. 
Sadly, the behavior of bystanders in the Robles attack is not an 
isolated incident. The daily papers carry frequent accounts of 
bystanders gathering to snap cell phone pictures of assaults, rapes, and 
even murders, as well as more run-of-the-mill accidents.
25
 
                                                          
24
 A comment to the New York Daily News web article about the Robles attack 
from a writer who identifies as “Pissed about Everything” reads: “I am so tired 
of people and their cell phones. The worst invention ever. Society crumbles 
while people stare into their stupid phones.” See Burke et al., supra note 17 (first 
comment). Not surprisingly, the follow up comments chide the writer for 
overstatement and for neglecting the positive side of the invention, including 
that in this very case a cell phone was used to call for help. But we get the drift. 
25
 See, e.g., Associated Press, No One Made an Effort: Arrest Made After 
Bystanders Watch Subway Death, Sydney Morning Herald News (Dec. 6, 2012), 
http://www.smh.com.au/world/no-one-made-an-effort-arrest-made-after-
bystanders-watch-subway-death-20121205-2awka.html [https://perma.cc/S6VB-
N3FJ]; Max Fisher, China’s Bystander Problem: Another Death After Crowd 
Ignores Woman in Peril, Wash. Post (Oct. 24, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/10/24/chinas-
bystander-problem-another-death-after-crowd-ignores-woman-in-peril 
[https://perma.cc/RWT8-BE9B] (security cameras showed over a dozen people 
gawking and taking pictures of a woman whose head was caught between traffic 
rails; 30 minutes passed before someone thought to help); Madison Gray, The 
Subway Shove Homicide: How Two New Yorkers’ Lives Became Tragically 
Linked, Time (Dec. 6, 2012), http://newsfeed.time.com/2012/12/06/the-subway-
shove-homicide-how-two-new-yorkers-lives-became-tragically-linked 
[https://perma.cc/3EAE-Q7ZP] (accounts of how bystanders took pictures and 
filmed as man pushed onto tracks stared down an oncoming subway train); Joe 
Kemp, ‘I became really afraid’: New Jersey mom pummeled in front of her 2-
year-old son feared for child during brutal attack, N.Y. Daily News (June 27, 
2014), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/new-jersey-mom-
pummeled-front-2-year-old-son-feared-child-brutal-attack-article-1.1846214 
[https://perma.cc/LZ88-CL5T] (during fight in a parking lot between two 
McDonald’s co-workers during which several bystanders recorded the 
confrontation instead of calling for help); Edgar Sandoval & Bill Hutchinson, 
Widow, daughter of man pushed to his death on subway tracks outraged by New 
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Recently, an Internet subculture has also developed in which those 
who witness violent assaults stand by to record the incidents without 
intervening, and then they post the videos on social media. For some, 
aspects of this phenomenon have coalesced around a website named 
“WorldStar Hiphop.”
26
 According to one estimate this site garners 3.4 
million visitors and 17 million page views per day.
27
 
Some of the assaults are staged,
28
 but many are not, and witnesses 
often encounter the scenes through happenstance. In several of these 
situations, authorities learned that wrongdoing had occurred only once 
the videos had reached viral status.
29
 For example, in one November 
2011 incident on the New York City subway, a witness recorded a 
man leaning against the doors of the car telling another man to stop 
spitting on the train; almost immediately, three men attacked the man 
near the door and savagely beat him.
30
 Throughout the video, 
witnesses visibly laughed as the victim was repeatedly punched and 
                                                                                                                                         




 World Star Hip Hop, http://worldstarhiphop.com (last accessed Oct. 18, 2016). 
27
 See Craig D. Lindsey, On Culture: WorldStar is portal to what’s wrong with 
mankind, The News & Observer (Apr. 18, 2015), 
http://www.newsobserver.com/entertainment/ent-columns-
blogs/article18750474.html [https://perma.cc/5TKG-QDYH]. Many thanks to 
James Simmons for alerting me to this phenomenon and for research assistance 
on this section. 
28
 See Lacey Lett, Disturbing Fight Video in Oklahoma City Brings Awareness to 
Alarming Trend, KFOR (Dec. 7, 2015), http://kfor.com/2015/12/07/disturbing-
fight-video-in-oklahoma-city-brings-awareness-to-alarming-trend 
[https://perma.cc/C6FV-BV2U] (quoting a social media expert who described 
how “there’s a whole popular sub-culture on the internet of people staging fights 
and then recording it, and then putting it on the internet because, in their world, 
that’s how you gain popularity.”). 
29
 See, e.g., Amanda Milkovits, Two Arrested After Providence Fight Video 
Featuring Samurai Sword Goes Viral, Providence Journal (Sept. 24, 2015), 
http://www.providencejournal.com/article/20150924/NEWS/150929613 
[https://perma.cc/ZPW8-FKCY] (in which a couple fights with a neighbor as 
children are heard screaming “Mommy!” in the background. Police only began 
investigating once they were tipped off six days later after the video had reached 
781,000 views.). 
30
 NYPD Seek Three Men in Brutal L Train Beating (VIDEO), Huffington Post 
(Nov. 16, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/16/nypd-seek-three-
men-in-br_n_1097472.html [https://perma.cc/A9Z4-ABEA]. 
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kicked after falling to the ground.
31
 At the 50-second mark, one 
woman yelled “WorldStar baby!”
32
 In the video, the witnesses can be 
seen moving to another car, where they continue to record the fight 
through the window and laugh while the victim, left alone and 
bleeding profusely, tried to regain his balance.
33
 Only days later, once 
the video had reached nearly 50,000 views, did police learn of any 
wrongdoing and begin their investigation.
34
 Similar assaults have been 
recorded with alarming regularity on countless street corners, onboard 
public transportation, and in schools throughout the country.
35
 
In the aftermath of the New York City subway assault, a columnist 
for Gothamist tried to make sense of the phenomenon. He wrote: 
The site’s popularity has created a sort of voyeuristic 
feedback loop, in which disassociated bystanders 
immediately videotape violent incidents and act as if 
they’re already watching a video on the Internet. This 
particular video serves as a perfect example of how 
violence becomes instant entertainment these days: as 
the young man is getting brutally beaten, the woman 




A correspondent for the Boston Globe similarly observed that since 
“the drawn-out drama of narrative is edited out for efficiency,” these 
types of videos “satisfy our craving for conflict with a quick, 
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 See id. 
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 ‘L’ Train Attack Caught on Video; Cops Looking for Suspects: Nervous 
Straphangers Say Crime Appears to Be Escalating Underground, CBS New 
York (Nov. 16, 2011). http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2011/11/16/l-train-attack-
caught-on-video-cops-looking-for-suspects [https://perma.cc/AZ2P-ZPW4]. 
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 See Steven Kurutz, The Creator of WorldStarHipHop Plots His Second Act, 




 John Del Signore, Police Seek 3 Men for Beating L Train Rider Who Scolded 
Them for Spitting, Gothamist (Nov. 16, 2011), 
http://gothamist.com/2011/11/16/police_search_for_men_in_beating_of.php 
[https://perma.cc/HS9A-XP9Q]. 
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concentrated dose.”
37
 For viewers, “there’s a thrill built into 
spontaneously caught footage capturing the rare collision of 
happenstance and comeuppance.”
38
 Similarly, sociologist Jeff Ferrell 
observed that the phenomenon reflects a culture that has become so 
desensitized to violence that observers barely flinch when taking out 
their cameras and hitting record: “Violence is normalized as a part of 
sitcoms and news coverage and video games. In one fight, a kid really 
did go to the hospital with a fractured skull. It’s not fake in that sense, 
but it’s immediately perceived as an image.”
39
 
Further, bystanders have much to gain in satisfying this captive 
online audience. As one journalist observed, witnesses who upload 
these videos are rewarded with “the possibility of being 
instantaneously famous” or becoming an “automatic celebrity.”
40
 
Posting a particularly violent video can boost one’s “street cred” 




The creator of WorldStar, Lee O’Denat, places the phenomenon 
within a journalistic frame, explaining that it “provides coverage of 
communities that larger news organizations like CNN or MSNBC 
might ignore. It can be ugly at times, but so is reality.”
42
 But the fact 
remains that bystanders are extracting voyeuristic pleasure from 
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 Jason Parham, The Man Behind the Web’s Most Controversial Video Site, 
Gawker (June 19, 2014), http://gawker.com/the-man-behind-the-webs-most-
controversial-video-site-1592857533 [https://perma.cc/EN7C-R8C4]. 
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another person’s pain and need for emergency assistance—oblivious to 
their need for immediate medical attention. 
Might bystanders in these circumstances, as the Seinfeld 
prosecutor argued, be held responsible—not only morally, but also 
legally—for this kind of “mocking and maligning?” 
C. Concerns about Moral Overload and Over-Breadth 
Shifting to the defense perspective, the opening statement for the 
Seinfeld defendants taps into another kind of gut moral instinct—the 
unfairness of holding some people responsible for the consequences of 
another person’s bad actions. Their attorney argues that the 
categorization of the four witnesses as bystanders should determine 
their innocence: 
Chiles: I am shocked and chagrined, mortified and 
stupefied. This trial is outrageous! It is a waste of the 
taxpayers’ time and money. It is a travesty of justice 
that these four people have been incarcerated while the 
real perpetrator is walking around laughing—lying and 
laughing, laughing and lying. 
You know what these four people were? They were 
innocent bystanders. Now, you just think about that 
term. Innocent. Bystanders. Because that’s exactly what 
they were. We know they were bystanders, nobody’s 
disputing that. So how can a bystander be guilty? No 
such thing. Have you ever heard of a guilty bystander? 
No, because you cannot be a bystander and be guilty. 
Bystanders are by definition, innocent. That is the 
nature of bystanding. 
But no, they want to change nature here. They want to 
create a whole new animal—the guilty bystander. Don’t 
you let them do it. Only you can stop them.
43
 
The defense argument hones in on the category of bystanders as 
uninvolved, and therefore, not responsible. Are there circumstances in 
which this assessment is exactly right—bystanders are in some sense, 
by definition, innocent? If so, how might one sort through the 
difference? How might this distinction help to articulate a tort claim 
for “mocking and maligning,” or as I frame it, “exploitative 
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objectification,” that steers clear of legitimate concerns about moral 
overload? 
III. THE INTERIOR LIFE OF BYSTANDERS 
A. Making Space in the Law for the Interior Life of 
Bystanders 
One reason why it may be difficult to articulate when it would be 
appropriate to hold the Seinfeld characters responsible for the harm 
that they caused is because the harm seems to be grounded less in the 
performance of a physically observable action (or failure to act), and 
more in an interior attitude. The action-oriented focus of the legal and 
cultural commentary on cases involving bystanders’ obligations is a 
reflection of a broader quest for distilling objective rules and standards 
over subjective states of mind.
44
 This trend has in various ways 
obfuscated the potential focus on more subjective elements of the 
interior life of bystanders. 
Returning to the hypothetical of the expert swimmer, rope in hand, 
watching someone drown before her eyes, note the seemingly 
objective factors: a perfectly individuated bystander (there is only one 
bystander in the example); who is perfectly situated (has a clear view 
of what is happening); with the requisite expertise and training; 
perfectly equipped and prepared (rope in hand); and we might even 
presume an otherwise ready disposition (where quality of an expert 
athlete tends to convey a high level of confidence, focus and ability). 
In its practical and technical simplicity, the hypothetical ignores 
any reference to two factors that often come into play in a bystander’s 
response to an emergency. First, it elides the subjective perspective of 
the bystander, which embraces not only sensory conditions such as 
ability to see and hear, but also psychological factors such as how the 
bystander perceives and processes risks and fear. Second, it obscures 
the relational complexity that may permeate the various interactions 
on the scene, not only between bystanders, victims and perpetrators, 
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 See Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1870-1960 (1992) 
(“If there is a single, overriding, and repetitive theme running through Holmes’s 
writing, it is the necessity and desirability of establishing objective rules of law, 
that is, general rules that do not take the peculiar mental or moral state of 
individuals into account.”). 
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but also all of their interactions with structures of authority, such as the 
police or emergency responders.
45
 
In the common law of torts, when the decision-making process of 
bystanders is not invisible or caricatured as some form of moral 
monstrosity, it is often depicted as relatively flat. How might we 
retrieve a space in the law of torts to bring into full consideration the 
complexity of the interior life of bystanders, including how emotional 
reactions to trauma and/or violence may have an impact on the 
decision-making process? Examining the journalistic accounts of the 
bystander villains who failed to help in the well-known case of the 
murders of Kitty Genovese, the analysis below highlights the 
importance of a multi-faceted analysis that leaves room for the 
subjective emotions, fears and psychological limitations of those who 
find themselves face-to-face with brutal violence. 
B. Bystanders to the Kitty Genovese Murder 
March 13, 2014 marked the fiftieth anniversary of a murder that 
rocked the world. As recounted by the New York Times article that 
went 1960s-style-viral,
46
 in the early morning hours of March 13, 
1964, twenty-nine-year-old Kitty Genovese was returning from work 
to her middle-class Queens neighborhood. As she walked the few 
blocks to her apartment from the Long Island Railroad parking lot, she 
was brutally attacked and stabbed. Neighbors responded to her 
screams with lights and shouts, and the attacker retreated, only to 
return two more times, continuing the attack, which resulted in her 
death. According to the Times, “[f]or more than half an hour 38 
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 Compare these questions with Antony Honoré’s “easy enough” list of line-
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source, the New York Times at the height of its influence, a two-week-old story 
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respectable, law-abiding citizens in Queens watched a killer stalk and 
stab a woman in three separate attacks in Kew Gardens.”
47
 The article 
indicated that she lay bleeding for half an hour before the first call 
arrived to the police, who came immediately.
48
 The neighbor who 
finally made the belated call to the police sheepishly explained, “I 
didn’t want to get involved.”
49
 
The incident generated a wave of deep angst and soul searching: 
how could so many witnesses have failed to respond, even with 
something as easy as a call to the police?
50
 The year following the 
attack, the University of Chicago hosted an interdisciplinary 
conference that brought together legal theorists, philosophers, 
sociologists and journalists to discuss the case and address proposals 
for a change in the no-duty-to-rescue rule.
51
 The passive indifference 
and cold-hearted inhumanity of these “thirty-eight witnesses” became 
something of a mantra that generated intense public concern.
52
 
The journalist keynote speaker for the conference, Alan Barth, 
surmised that the trends of urbanization, industrialization and 
“extraordinary mobility” presented a double barrier to bystander 
involvement. Decisions to intervene are hindered not only by the 
isolation and anonymity that tend to emerge amidst crowds of any 
large urban environment, but also by deliberate efforts to seek and 
preserve a high degree of privacy.
53
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Over the years, further investigation and scholarship have revealed 
that the initial New York Times article was in several respects factually 
wrong and seriously misleading.
54
 While sources for the revisionary 
account could be multiple, this discussion refers primarily to a study 
by Kevin Cook published on the fiftieth anniversary of the murder 
which incorporates much of the previous research and carefully sifts 
through what is fact and what is legend. Reconstructing the events and 
probing the witnesses’ varying perspectives, Cook’s account helps to 
correct the record in several respects: a neighbor actually did call the 
police immediately; probably a maximum of two neighbors were in a 
position to understand that Genovese was in mortal danger; at least 
one of these two had objective reasons to fear contact with the police; 
and most significantly, Kitty Genovese did not die alone, but in the 
arms of one of her neighbors.
55
 
The next sections consider these elements as part of an 
examination of the distortion, or caricature, of the interior life of 
bystanders who are part of a crowd. In contrast to an en masse 
indictment against “thirty-eight witnesses,” this analysis considers the 
extent to which the sensory and subjective perspectives of the various 
individual bystanders helps to explain, and for the most part justify, 
the instances in which it seemed that there was a lack of response. 
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1. The Various Perspectives of the Genovese Witnesses 
“For more than half an hour 38 respectable, law-abiding citizens in 
Queens watched a killer stalk and stab a woman in three separate 
attacks in Kew Gardens.”
56
 Abraham Rosenthal, editor of the New 
York Times and the likely author of this first line, later admitted that he 
knew this was impossible.
57
 Thirty-eight was the number of entries in 
the police log of the people who were interviewed in the days 
following the crime.
58
 Reporters never identified the witnesses, but 
accepted the detective reports at face value.
59
 Instead, by the 
prosecutor’s count, no more than five or six could have seen or heard 
enough to know that Genovese was in mortal danger.
60
 Two of these 
were kept off of the witness stand so as not to distract the jury from the 
actions of the accused, Winston Moseley.
61
 
What is made extremely opaque by the New York Times lead, 
describing thirty-eight people who “watched” for “half an hour,” is 
that two, not three, attacks took place in two different locations.
62
 
Spatially and aurally it would have been impossible for the same group 
of people to see or hear both.
63
 After the first attack, Moseley feared 
that he might be identified by association with his car, which was 
parked nearby.
64
 He left the scene to move the car.
65
 Genovese got up 
and staggered around the corner, out of the sight and earshot of those 
who may have seen the first attack from their windows.
66
 Because she 
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 See id. at 107-09. 
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 The first attack took place on Austin Street, and from the Mowbray apartment 
building, several residents heard the ruckus on the street below. From the 
seventh floor, Robert Mozer saw a man bent over a woman, striking her. 
Assuming it was a domestic spat, not unusual just outside the pub, he lifted his 
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 Id. 215-16. 
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had been stabbed in the lung, by the time she reached the second 
location, an indoor entrance to an apartment, she did not have enough 
lung capacity to emit an audible scream when Moseley returned.
67
 
Of the seeming large number of witnesses, only two were likely to 
have understood that she was in mortal danger and in need of 
immediate help.
68
 Joseph Fink worked nights as an assistant 
superintendent at the Mowbray apartment building.
69
 From an office 
on the ground floor, he had a clear view of the scene of the first 
attack.
70
 From fifty yards away, “he had watched a slender man in a 
stocking cap plunge a knife into Kitty’s back. He remembered that the 
knife blade was shiny.”
71
 The thought occurred to him that he could go 
to retrieve a baseball bat from the basement, but in the end, he did 
nothing and went downstairs and fell asleep.
72
 
The other witness, Karl Ross, knew Genovese and was a frequent 
guest in her home.
73
 He had been drinking most of the night, but at 
3:30 a.m. he heard the cries from the initial Austin Street attack.
74
 He 
did nothing, and the cries died down.
75
 A few minutes later he was 
startled by a noise coming from the back of his building. He heard 
scuffling and a muffled cry.
76
 After a few minutes, he finally opened 
the door a crack, and saw a man with a knife on top of Genovese.
77
 
But he was too drunk and too scared, both of the attacker and of the 
police, to make an immediate call from his own home: “he didn’t want 
the cops knocking on his door.”
78
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2. How Bystanders Did Help According to Their Capacities 
According to the New York Times, it took half an hour after the 
attack for anyone to call: it was “3:50 by the time the police received 
their first call, from a man who was a neighbor of Miss Genovese. In 
two minutes they were at the scene.”
79
 The Inspector lamented, “If we 
had been called when he first attacked, [she] might not be dead.”
80
 
But according to Kew Gardens historian Joseph De May, a key 
witness was overlooked by reporters, police, and everyone else 
involved in the investigation, one who did call immediately after the 
first attack.
81
 Another neighbor, Andrée Picq, lived in the fourth floor 
of the Mowbray.
82
 After she heard the initial screaming, she stayed at 
her window, and saw the man come back, this time with a feathered 
hat.
83
 She watched him check the doors of the train station, and then 
lost sight of him.
84
 As Cook recounts, “Unsure of her English, unsure 
of what she had just seen, afraid to identify herself to the authorities, 
she put down the phone.”
85
 Finally, Sam Koshkin, from the sixth floor 
of the Mowbray, wanted to phone the police, but his wife discouraged 
him. “I told him there must have been thirty calls already.”
86
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 Id. at 161. What was termed by social psychologists as the “bystander effect” 
was the subject of studies of staged emergency situations to measure whether 
participants would intervene to help, and if so, the length of time that it took. 
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The New York Times article gives the impression that the two 
bystanders who did emerge were simply milling about the street at 
four in the morning. “The neighbor, a 70-year old woman and another 
woman were the only persons on the street. Nobody else came 
forward.”
87
 In reality, in response to a round of calls set off by Ross’s 
alert, Genovese’s friend Sophie Farrar rushed to the scene—and for all 
she knew, to a murder in progress.
88
 When the police arrived, they 
found Genovese cradled in Farrar’s arms; Farrar was saying, “It’s 
okay, they’re coming. It won’t be long.”
89
 
3. Subjective Perceptions of the Risks of Calling the Police 
At the University of Chicago conference, general reference was 
made to a certain mistrust of the police.
90
 As Gregory urged, “we must 
get people to believe that the police will take them seriously and 
respect their anonymity when they telephone.”
91
 Cook’s account 
provides a much less sanitized version of the interactions at stake. 
First, it is important to note that the New York Times story, which 
appeared two weeks after the attack, finds its genesis in a lunch 
between Times editor Abraham Rosenthal and police commissioner 
Michael Murphy.
92
 One might extrapolate from these origins that it is 
not surprising that a detail such as Sam Hoffman’s initial call to the 
police might have slipped through the cracks of the investigative 
reporting. 
It is also important to note that at the time many New Yorkers 
considered the police to be “bullies with guns.”
93
 To illustrate the 
point, Cook catalogues a series of letters to the Times recounting the 
police’s general lack of responsiveness to citizen complaints and 
reports.
94
 But perhaps most important for this case is how a key 
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bystander’s subjective perceptions of the police might have informed 
and determined his failure to act. Ross’s fear of calling the police that 
evening was probably in large part informed by the New York City 




Cook reports Ross was gay, and was friends with Kitty Genovese 
and Mary Ann Zielonko, who were living together and in a lesbian 
relationship. According to Cook, the negative treatment of 
homosexuals by the police gave Ross good reason to fear calling 
them.
96
 To give some idea of the treatment that Ross might have 
expected from the police, it is interesting to note Zielonko’s 
description of the reactions of their other gay friends to the 
investigation: “My friends all stopped talking to me. They thought 
they were being watched. They thought their phones were tapped.”
97
 
Already before the exposure to the trauma of the murder, Ross was, 
according to Zielonko, a “very nervous, frightened person.”
98
 Even in 
the midst of an alcohol-induced stupor he may have intuited that a call 
to the police might provoke an invasive police investigation, bringing 
him beyond his threshold for anxiety and stress.
99
 
What is the upshot of this more complex account of the 
perspectives of the various witnesses to the Genovese murder? By my 
lights, it seems that just about all of the neighbors did their best with 
the information they had gleaned from what they were able to see and 
hear at the time. If one factors in both subjective perspectives and 
historical sensitivity to the relationship between the police and gay and 
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lesbian individuals and communities in New York in the 1960s, it is 
far from clear that Ross’s failure to call the police was indicative of 
cruel indifference. This is not to negate that there may have been at 
least one “moral monster” in the mix; Joseph Fink, who was an eye-
witness from the first floor of the apartment building in front of the 
crime scene fifty feet away, had watched Moseley plunge the blade 
into Genovese’s back, and even remembered that the blade was shiny. 
But then again, we do not have any further information that would 
help to understand his subjective perspective and particular fears. 
This is not to say that Ross did the right thing. Nor is it to say that 
he should not have experienced pangs of conscience for having done 
the wrong thing. Acknowledging the complexity of the subjective 
interior life of bystanders—for example, how they perceive the risks of 
interacting with authorities such as the police—would not preclude an 
argument that bystanders should under some circumstances be held 
morally responsible for their inaction. 
From the outside, a witness such as Ross seems to have been 
perfectly positioned to help. From the outside, nothing seems easier 
than calling the police or shouting for help. But from what we might 
intuit about the historical, circumstantial, social and psychological 
factors in these cases, from inside the mind of Ross his emotionally-
charged decision-making process was probably much more fraught. 
Many hope that they could respond with heroic generosity to the 
needs of others, but most people would admit that in the face of 
danger, pressure, or other kinds of fear, they are just as likely to 
experience paralysis, an instinct to flee, or at least to pull back from 
engagement. Appreciation for the range of emotions and the reactive 
nature of decisions to help (or not) also highlights that most people fall 
somewhere in the middle of that vast range between devious villains 
and super-heroes. A more complex account of the interior and 
emotional life of people who encounter the trauma or urgent need of 
others can help to ground our discussions of morality and law in a set 
of more realistic expectations about human psychology and behavior. 
IV. PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR A DISTINCTION BETWEEN 
“PURE BYSTANDERS” AND “ENGAGED SPECTATORS” 
Holding steady these observations about the interior life of 
bystanders, the analysis now moves to the project of delineating a 
framework in which the decision-making process of a bystander is 
accorded full respect, including respect for decisions made against the 
backdrop of fears, emotional reactions, and psychological limitations. 
92 UMass Law Review v. 12 | 68 
In considering which philosophical framework might help to 
articulate these distinctions, this analysis considers both utilitarian and 
deontological accounts of bystander obligations. Section A highlights 
a few of the conceptual limitations of some utilitarian accounts of 
bystander obligations. Section B explores some of the conceptual 
strengths in selected aspects of Kantian ethics, including the broad 
obligation to always treat humanity as an ends and never a means, as 
well as the acknowledgment of the need for ample space to discern 
what that duty might require in any given circumstance. On this basis, 
Section C proposes drawing a clear distinction between the moral 
obligations of bystanders who pass by or otherwise disengage from the 
scene of an assault or accident (“pure bystanders”), and those who 
choose to lock their attention on the scene (“engaged spectators”).
 100
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A. Conceptual Limits in Some Utilitarian Accounts of 
Bystander Obligations 
When considering a bystander’s encounter with a person in need of 
emergency assistance, a frequent move in philosophical and legal 
analysis is to begin weighing interests. For example, when weighing 
the interests of a person whose life is at stake with the interests of a 
bystander who is in a position to help without undue risk to oneself, 
the calculus seems to point toward the circumstances dictating to the 
bystander exactly what he or she should do or should have done. Why 
resist that route? 
It is interesting to note the parallels between the Seinfeld 
prosecutor’s case discussed above
101
 and Jeremy Bentham’s classic 
argument for the appropriateness of punishing a bystander’s failure to 
help a person in need of assistance. Like the Seinfeld prosecutor, 
Bentham queries: “[I]n cases where the person is in danger, why 
should it not be the duty of every man to save another from mischief, 
when it can be done without prejudicing himself, as well as to abstain 
from bringing it on him?”
102
 In these circumstances, given the goal 
that legislation and policy should produce the greatest good for the 
greatest number of people, the gain in utility through saving a life 
would certainly outweigh the slight cost to individual autonomy that 
follows from legal compulsion to act.
103
 Given the presumption that 
the risk and imposition would be minimal, and the obvious disparity 
between the value of the life of the victim and the inconvenience of the 
one in a position to assist, Bentham’s examples focus on the optimal 
positioning of the bystander to give immediate assistance: 
A woman’s head-dress catches fire: water is at hand: a 
man, instead of assisting to quench the fire, looks on, 
and laughs at it. A drunken man, falling with his face 
downwards into a puddle, is in danger of suffocation: 
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lifting his head a little on one side would save him: 
another man sees this and lets him lie. A quantity of 
gunpowder lies scattered about a room: a man is going 
into it with a lighted candle: another, knowing this, lets 
him go in without warning.
104
 
Bentham concludes with a rhetorical question: “Who is there that 
in any of these cases would think punishment misapplied?”
105
 
There is another parallel between Bentham’s example and the 
Seinfeld Finale. Considering Bentham’s illustration of the woman with 
the headdress on fire, what drives this intuition that punishment would 
be appropriate? Not only does the man look on, but he also laughs at 
her predicament. Other interactions are more ambiguous. For example, 
all we know about the bystander to the drunken man with his face in 
the puddle is that he “sees” him; we have no further information about 
the surrounding circumstances, and what else might be going on in the 
man’s mind that might have informed his decision not to intervene. 
Similarly, the decision-making process of the person observing the 
man with the candle entering the room with gunpowder remains 
opaque; we know only that he has observed the other man entering. 
When one considers in depth the subjective perspective of a 
bystander, even the seemingly easy examples—e.g., lifting the face of 
a drunken man out of a puddle—pose difficult questions. What if the 
seemingly drunk man is lying in a dark alley, and I am alone? What if 
he is faking it and has a knife or gun? Or what if that scenario is 
unlikely as an objective matter, but subjectively I struggle with this 
fear because I am paranoid? What if that particular alley is for me an 
emotional trigger that could provoke a panic attack because I was 
assaulted there last summer? What if I am concerned that he might 
have a communicable disease and I do not have gloves? And I am a 
hypochondriac? What if I am late for work as a nurse in the emergency 
room, and on this particular day, I know that we are short-staffed, such 
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 See, e.g., John M. Darley & C. Daniel Batson, “From Jerusalem to Jericho”: A 
Study in Dispositional and Situational Variables in Helping Behavior, 27 J. 
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Especially as the cases become harder, more violent, and perhaps 
include strong elements of fear and anxiety, how is one to measure the 
lengths to which a bystander should go? Should internal anxiety be 
measured by a subjective or objective standard? Both the Seinfeld 
statute articulating a duty to aid “when it is reasonable to do so,” and 
Bentham’s rule that the duty to “save another from mischief” would 
apply “when it can be done without prejudicing himself,” leave open a 
host of serious and difficult questions. Further, the framework of 
“weighing interests” seems insufficient for the work of understanding 
how to grapple with these questions. 
Consider, for example, the difficulty of assessing the response of 
Kitty Genovese’s neighbor Ross in response to the attack on 
Genovese. Once it is clear that the case is not “easy,” it is difficult to 
begin drawing lines—was it enough to call a neighbor instead of the 
police? How should one measure the counterweight of Ross’s 
particular fear of an invasive police investigation? How might one 
account for impairment of judgment due to alcohol? The large number 
of variables required for a strict utilitarian analysis leaves much to 
purportedly objective but ultimately arbitrary assessments. 
Notwithstanding the appeal of the “greater good for the greater 
number,” few people are truly comfortable with the idea of an 
unbounded duty to the point of self-sacrifice. As Liam Murphy 
explains, the core of the problem with the utilitarian argument is the 
concern about demands without limits. While utilitarian ideas may be 




For Murphy this presents a major obstacle in the application of 
utilitarian theory. He explains: “We cannot breezily evaluate legal 
institutions such as tort law or the criminal law with the utilitarian 
criterion without thinking about the implications of that criterion in the 
realm of personal conduct.”
108
 As Murphy surmises: 
                                                                                                                                         
Personality & Soc. Psych. 100, 108 (1973) (noting how the elements of “hurry” 
and conflicting commitments may influence a decision to help or not). 
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 See Liam Murphy, Beneficence, Law, and Liberty: The Case of Required 
Rescue, 89 Geo. L. J. 605, 644, 646 (2001); see also Judith Lichtenberg, 
Negative Duties, Positive Duties, and the “New Harms,” 120 Ethics 557, 557 
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If commitment to a duty to rescue brings with it a 
commitment to a general moral requirement of 
beneficence, and if the most straightforward general 
requirement of beneficence is the optimizing 
requirement of the utilitarians, it would seem that the 
commitment to legal duties to rescue comes at the price 




This objection was at the core of the seminal bystander analysis of 
Lord Macaulay, who illustrated his concerns with the question of 
whether a surgeon who was the only person who could perform a life-
saving operation could be forced to travel some distance to do so.
110
 
Lord Macaulay remarked: 
It is true that the man who, having abundance of 
wealth, suffers a fellow creature to die of hunger at his 
feet, is a bad man—a worse man, probably, than many 
of those for whom we have provided very severe 
punishment. But we are unable to see where, if we make 
such a man legally punishable, we can draw the line. If 
the rich man who refuses to save the beggar’s life at the 
cost of a little copper is a murderer, is the poor man 
just one degree above beggary also to be a murderer if 
he omits to invite the beggar to partake his hard earned 
rice? Again: If the rich man is a murderer for refusing 
to save the beggar’s life at the cost of a little copper, is 
he also to be a murderer if he refuses to save the 
beggar’s life at the cost of a thousand rupees?
111
 
When slightly more complex elements enter the scene such as 
violence, fear and anxiety, some lines of utilitarian reasoning run up 
against serious limitations. Not only do they risk vague and unbounded 
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application, they also risk missing the deeper story of what exactly 
hangs in the balance, in large part, because they lack more fine-tuned 
instruments that might help to account for more subjective factors. 
B. Conceptual Strengths in Some Elements of Kantian 
Thought 
In contrast to the limits discussed above, certain elements of 
Immanuel Kant’s thought may help to provide elements for a more 
complex assessment of the moral and legal obligations that may arise 
when a bystander encounters a person in need of emergency 
assistance. In particular, this section explores the extent to which 
selected concepts from Kant can form a framework that is 
simultaneously able to hold together affirmation of the principle of 
respect for the humanity of the victim, psychic space for the bystander 
to exercise discretion based on the specific circumstances, and an 
appreciation for just how emotionally charged these encounters may 
be.
 
Applying Kant’s distinction between perfect and imperfect 
obligations, as well as further explanation of wide and narrow duties, 
to an analysis of bystander response to a person in need of emergency 
assistance, an important distinction may be drawn. This distinction 
separates the maxims that a subject is required to hold from the process 
of discernment to decide what to do in a given situation.
112
 For 
example, returning to the scene of the Genovese murder, Ross would 
have undoubtedly had the duty to hold the maxim that a person should 
do all he could to help another person in Genovese’s situation. But did 
he, Ross, necessarily have the particular duty to call the police in that 
specific circumstance? I argue that Kant would not make that move. 
The discussion below fleshes out this claim. 
In the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant depicts the 
man for whom things are going well who refuses to help others whom 
he could help: 
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 See Immanuel Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, Ak. 6:411 (Mary Gregor trans., 
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“[He thinks]: what’s it to me? May everyone be as 
happy as heaven wills, or as he can make himself, I 
shall take nothing away from him, not even envy him; I 
just do not feel like contributing anything to his well-
being, or his assistance in need!’ . . . But even though it 
is possible that a universal law of nature could very 
well subsist according to that maxim, it is still 
impossible to will that such a principle hold everywhere 
as a law of nature. For a will that resolved upon this 
would conflict with itself, as many cases can yet come 
to pass in which one needs the love and compassion of 
others, and in which by such a law of nature spring 
from his own will, he would rob himself of all hope and 
the assistance he wishes for himself.
113
 
Or as expressed in the Formula of Universal Law: “Act only 
according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it 
should become a universal law.”
114
 
As described in the Groundwork, the duties are not minimalist. For 
example, with regard to the duty to oneself, “it is not enough that the 
action not conflict with humanity in our person as an end in itself; it 
must also harmonize with it.”
115
 Neglecting the predisposition to 
greater perfection might “admittedly be consistent with the 
preservation of humanity, as an end in itself, but not with the 
furtherance of this end.”
116
 Similarly, duties to others cannot be 
reduced to not “intentionally detracting” from the happiness of 
others—because such would be only a “negative and not a positive 
agreement with humanity, as an end in itself” unless everyone also 
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tries, as far as he can, “to further the ends of others.”
117
 As Kant 
summarizes: “For the ends of a subject who is an end in itself must, as 




That sounds pretty demanding. But in the Metaphysics of Morals, 
Kant clearly explains that setting maxims is only half of the project. 
His analysis also draws an important distinction between setting 
maxims and the process of discernment for deciding how one is to act 
in particular circumstances. 
If the law can prescribe only the maxim of actions, not actions 
themselves, this is a sign that it leaves a latitude (latitudine) for free 
choice in following (complying with) the law, that is, that the law 
cannot specify precisely in what way one is to act and how much one 
is to do by the action for an end that is also a duty. But a wide duty is 
not to be taken as permission to make exceptions to the maxim of 
actions, but only as permission to limit one maxim of duty by another 
(e.g., love of one’s neighbor in general by love of one’s parents), by 
which in fact the field for the practice of virtue is widened.
119
 
In the Metaphysics of Morals, this explanation is followed by a 
number of examples that flesh out the shape of Kant’s space for 
discretion. For example, when considering the question of choosing an 
occupation, one has a clear duty to cultivate one’s own talents, but the 
variety of circumstances in which people find themselves leave wide 
latitude for discretion: “No rational principle prescribes specifically 
how far one should go in cultivating one’s capacities.”
120
 Similarly, for 
the cultivation of morality, the duty prescribes “only the maxim of the 
action, that of seeing the basis of obligation solely in the law and not 




At this juncture, Kant’s system evinces a profound respect for the 
interior life, and the fact that human beings remain mysteries even to 
themselves: “For a man cannot see into the depth of his own heart so 
as to be quite certain, in even a single action, of the purity of his moral 
intention and the sincerity of his disposition, even when he has no 






 Kant, Metaphysics, supra note 110, at Ak. 6:390. 
120
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doubts about the legality of his action.”
122
 Also for this reason it is 
especially difficult to prescribe particular actions for particular 
circumstances. 
Most directly related to the question of bystander assistance, Kant 
explains both the impossibility of determining the extent to which one 
should sacrifice one’s own needs, and the potential for a conflict 
between the maxim of care for one’s own true needs, and that of care 
for the happiness of others. 
But I ought to sacrifice a part of my welfare to others without hope 
of return because this is a duty, and it is impossible to assign specific 
limits to the extent of this sacrifice. How far it should extend depends, 
in large part, on what each person’s true needs are in view of his 
sensibilities, and it must be left to each to decide this for himself. For a 
maxim of promoting others’ happiness at the sacrifice of one’s own 
happiness, one’s true needs, would conflict with itself if it were made a 
universal law. Hence this duty is only a wide one; the duty has in it a 
latitude for doing more or less, and no specific limits can be assigned 




The exercise of judgment, therefore, is inevitable—both in 
determining which maxim should apply to a particular case, and 
exactly how that maxim should be applied.
124
 
In the exercise of determining exactly what to do, as Nancy 
Sherman notes, emotions can actually help in the process: “in a fallible 
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way, they may give some access to values and concerns that might 
otherwise remain veiled from one’s reports about what motivates one’s 
action.”
125
 Further, much of the work of deliberation is not projecting 
out toward the abstract dimension of a universalizable maxim, but 
“reflecting on what respect for rational agency requires of us in the 
circumstances before us.”
126
 Sherman explains: 
On this view of deliberation, the Categorical Imperative 
functions not as a formal universalization procedure 
but, rather, as a more substantive norm prescribing 
positive and negative respect for rational agents 
generally, and more specifically, through specific 
norms such as nondeception or beneficence. The norms 
are supple in that they stand ready to be transformed 
and thickened by the circumstances themselves.
127
 
A final element of Kant’s analysis to consider is the interaction 
with what he describes as “subjective conditions of the receptiveness 
to the concept of duty, not as objective conditions of morality.”
128
 His 
examples include moral feeling, conscience, love of neighbor, and 
respect for self. These are “moral endowments”—gifts—which means 
that “anyone lacking them could have no duty to acquire them.”
129
 The 
same applies to “sympathetic joy and sadness”—“sensible feelings of 
pleasure or pain at another’s state of joy or sorrow.”
130
 
For the mere susceptibility, given by nature itself, to feel joy and 
sadness in common with others, there is no imperfect duty. In contrast, 
the capacity and the will to share in other’s feelings are based on 
practical reason, thus one can parse out an indirect duty to “share in 
the fate” of others, cultivating “the compassionate natural feelings in 
us, and to make use of them as so many means to sympathy based on 
moral principles and the feelings appropriate to them.” Specific 
examples include not avoiding the poor, the sick, and debtors with the 
excuse of avoiding sharing painful feelings, but rather to seek these 
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people out.”
131
 In other words, feelings and emotions are not always in 
our control, and within Kant’s framework there is no specific duty to 
feel a certain way—even to feel compassion. 
On the other hand, this can be distinguished from the cultivation of 
an attitude of callous indifference to others and to their needs. 
According to Karen Stohr, Kant’s ethical framework would 
contemplate a narrow duty to avoid this. She parses beneficence as a 
two-part duty, embracing not only “the familiar obligation to adopt the 
wide maxim of helping others on occasion,” but also “a narrow duty 
parallel to the narrow duties of respect, which prohibit contempt, 
arrogance, defamation, and mockery.”
132
 For example, to mock 
someone, treating her as a mere means to the end of the entertainment 
of my friends, is to fail to acknowledge the other person’s status “as an 
end in the negative sense.”
133
 Stohr proposes that “we interpret 
beneficence as implying a narrow duty to avoid indifference to others 
as ends in the positive sense or as setters of ends.”
134
 Helping actions, 
therefore, would be obligatory in circumstances in which “helping is 
the only way to acknowledge the other person’s status as a positive 
end,”
135
 “although we are not always required to help, we are always 
required not to be indifferent. When helping someone is the only way 
not to be indifferent to her, we are required to help.”
136
 
What might Kant make of Karl Ross’s decision not to call the 
police but to call a neighbor instead? Note that Ross did not neglect to 
engage in some helping action—calling a neighbor. The circumstances 
presented numerous ways for him to act on his obligation not to be 
indifferent, and in this way, to express as he was able respect for 
humanity present in Genovese. 
Further, as Kant explains, “Imperfect duties are, accordingly, only 
duties of virtue. Fulfillment of them is merit; but failure to fulfill them 
is not in itself culpability. But rather a mere deficiency in moral worth, 
unless the subject should make it his principle not to comply with such 
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duties.”
137
 If Ross did fall short of his moral obligations, then from the 
further details in Cook’s account it seems that it might have been more 
due to weakness, want of virtue or lack of moral strength, rather than 
an intentional transgression which reflected a principle, and thus 
vice.
138
 The elements of Kantian ethics noted above would have 
accorded him the latitude to discern what he was able to do in light of 
his emotional state in these specific circumstances, and then act 
accordingly. It could very well be that in calling the neighbor he did all 
he could have done under the circumstances, and as evaluated from the 
complexity of his subjective perspective. 
C. Distinctions between the Moral Obligations of “Pure 
Bystanders” and “Engaged Spectators” 
What are the implications of these Kantian concepts for an analysis 
for the moral obligations of bystanders in varying circumstances? As 
discussed above, this Article proposes an analytical distinction 
between an “engaged spectator” and a “pure bystander”—a person 
who may notice something about the incident, but who does not stop 
to focus on it. When considering the moral obligations of persons in 
these categories, the first issue to address is whether bystanders who, 
for various reasons, do not stop or focus on the incident and the 
victim’s need for assistance should really get off scot-free. It seems 
odd to treat more favorably a kind of passive and perhaps even 
cowardly non-engagement. 
Here it is important to note that to acknowledge the respect 
inherent in a Kantian space for discretion for a bystander to decide 
whether and/or how to engage a victim in need of emergency 
assistance is not equivalent to letting a bystander off scot-free. It is 
simply to acknowledge that, for example, it is very difficult to tell 
whether the decision not to directly intervene in that moment was the 
best that Karl Ross could manage under the circumstances. 
For this reason, I believe it would be difficult for the law to draw 
any hard lines regarding civil legal responsibility dependent on a risk 
and injury that the bystander did not cause and/or did not exacerbate. 
Notwithstanding his proximity to the violence, Karl Ross was a “pure 
bystander.” The concepts from Kantian ethical analysis discussed 
above can help to hold together respect for the needs of victims, and 
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respect for the discretionary space that bystanders require to decide 
whether to engage a particular scene and what to do in particular 
circumstances, without neglecting the gamut of circumstantial and 
emotional factors that might influence a person’s encounter with a 
vulnerable person in need of emergency assistance. 
At what point though, would a narrow duty that prohibits 
“contempt, arrogance, defamation, and mockery” be triggered for a 
bystander?
139
 In what circumstances might an interaction between a 
bystander and a vulnerable person become a failure to treat that person 
as an end in himself, and as a positive setter of his own ends? In other 
words, when does a bystander cross the line, moving out of the pure 
bystander’s discretionary space into the category of an “engaged 
spectator”? 
One potential distinguishing mark may be the use of technology 
such as a cell phone. Cell phone technology and its analogies generally 
require one to stop and focus, therefore, to directly engage a person 
who is in a vulnerable state. The decision to stop and focus is itself an 
exercise of discretion which has led to a form of direct contact with 
another human being. Distinctions in the moral analysis follow not 
from a preference for passive disengagement, but from a recognition 
that this kind of contact between a bystander and a victim calls for a 
separate analysis. 
In his analysis of bystander obligations, Jeremy Waldron 
highlights the importance of proximity and the nature of a more direct 
and focused encounter with a victim in a vulnerable state. At the 
outset, he recognizes that the categories of proximity and distance 
raise a number of important moral questions: 
Do moral concerns and requirements diminish over 
distance, so that our duties are stronger to those who 
are near to us, and weaken to vanishing point as 
possible beneficiaries of our actions and inactions are 
found further and further away? And what does 
“distance” mean in these circumstances? When is a 
person near to me? When is a person far away? Is it a 
matter of who they are, and of their relation to me? Or 
is it sheer geography?
140
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No one needs to answer all of these questions to discern that 
particular duties and harms may emerge on the basis of physical 
proximity. In his interpretation of the Good Samaritan parable, 
Waldron urges that we resist the temptation to reduce the message to a 
fairly straightforward form of moral universalism in which “we owe a 
duty of neighborly love to each and every person on the face of the 
earth in virtue of their simple humanity.”
141
 Waldron argues: 
So is it wrong to see the “moral” of the parable as 
prescribing nothing but a diffuse and universal 
concern? It is not altogether at odds with that, but what 
it prescribes—and the reason it hangs onto the idea of 
‘neighbor’—is openness and responsiveness to actual 
human need in whatever form it confronts us.
142
 
For Waldron, focus on the victim’s predicament is an important 
threshold. Always in the context of an argument for an obligation to 
rescue, he explains: 
In almost all situations where rescue might plausibly be 
required by morality (or for that matter by law), all the 
agents concerned—potential helpers and potential 
victims—are likely to have their attention focused on 
the victim’s predicament, and they have to make a 
serious effort of will to shift from that orientation to 




Thus, for Waldron, there is something “morally special” about 
being “on the spot”—in the narrative of the Good Samaritan, where 
the man had fallen among thieves, and as distinguished from broad and 
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 Id. at 338. 
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 Id. at 343 (emphasis added). Waldron also articulates the moral shortcomings of 
the bystanders in the Good Samaritan parable for having crossed to the other 
side of road. He makes much of their intentional and deliberate choice, “going 
out of their way not to help, or going out of their way to avoid a decision about 
whether to help.” See id. at 343. My distinction between “pure bystanders” and 
“engaged spectators” would not foreclose moral responsibility or blame; but I 
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from the mere action of crossing the road. See also Waldron, supra note 111, at 
1081. 
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universal general obligations.
144
 In sum, to focus more sharply on the 
obligations of engaged spectators is not to make a definitive statement 
about the moral obligations of pure bystanders, but only to submit that 
the circumstances require different categories for analysis. 
What about the category of spectators who stop and engage the 
scene, aware of the victim’s vulnerability and immediate need, and 
then simply watch, doing nothing to help—but that watching just 
happens not to be mediated by recording technology? The blurred line 
that this fact pattern indicates illustrates that the moral evaluation of a 
bystander’s interaction with the victim in an emergency context does 
not hinge on the use of the technology in and of itself. Rather it hinges 
on what that use signifies about both the complex circumstances and 
the interior life and decision-making process of the engaged spectator. 
What does it signify? That question, together with the question of 
moral evaluation, involves interpretation as well as openness to other 
factors that may change the narrative of meaning in substantial ways. 
What does it mean to take a cell phone picture of an ongoing assault 
on a victim? Obviously, it need not necessarily be indicative of intent 
to harm the victim’s dignity. In the Robles incident, we should 
entertain at least the possibility that someone in the crowd was taking 
pictures with the intent to help the victim and the community—
perhaps on the assumption that someone had already called for help; 
and perhaps with the idea of turning them over to a police 
investigation, in order to find or confirm the identity of the 
perpetrator.
145
 Perhaps it was filmed as a record of what happened, or 
perhaps there were many motives behind the recording. 
Thus I do not submit that a person who snaps a cell phone picture 
in circumstances such as the Robles assault is automatically subject to 
moral condemnation. Nor will I argue that a cell phone necessarily 
makes all the difference. The moral significance of taking a picture of 
an assault victim can vary greatly, depending on one’s intent. As noted 
above, on the far end of the spectrum (moving from good to bad to 
worse), one might have thought that someone else had already called 
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for help, and the greatest service that one could provide for the victim 
and for the safety of the community was to record the event in order to 
assist with the future police investigation. Slightly more ambiguous, 
perhaps the intent was to mark in some way—to witness, to 
acknowledge—the reality of violence in the community, as part of 
one’s own effort to help heal these maladies when possible. For 
example, a university professor of sociology may have planned to 
show the picture to his or her class as part of a discussion aimed at 
understanding the challenges of urban violence. Or to introduce a 
further layer, one may have intended to take a picture of people taking 
pictures, as part of a critique of this phenomenon. 
Picture-taking may also have been an almost automatic, mindless 
act, one more sight or sound to take in on the way to work, together 
with a bagel and morning coffee, and an indication of being on auto-
pilot, not intending to harm the victim, not intending anything, really. 
If we take seriously the interior life of bystanders, what happens when 
we find in that interiority neither good purpose nor malice, nor any 
intent to harm, but simply a mindless reaction? 
Further down the spectrum, how do we account for the portion of 
the population for whom taking a picture of someone who is suffering 
provokes an addictive pleasure, and for whom continued private 
viewing of the pictures might be a further source of pleasure? Or 
worse, one’s intent may have been to post the pictures to a Facebook 
account, accompanied by sneeringly brutal remarks that aimed to bully 
and shame the victim—perhaps, like in the Seinfeld Finale,
146
 even 
alluding to his ethnicity, his weight, or other personal characteristics 
that could work to continue the assault on his person and his integrity. 
Or motives may have been mixed and shifting—perhaps starting to 
record as a somewhat mindless reaction, becoming horrified by the 
violence, and then ending up with resolve to share the pictures with the 
police. Or vice-versa—starting out with resolve to go to the police, but 
worries of somehow becoming more involved in an investigation, and 
questions about one’s own role as a witness prevents one from doing 
so. With the realization of having done nothing to help, one may also 
feel ashamed, as to delete the pictures as part of an attempt to delete 
the incident from one’s mind and heart. Or one may simply forget 
about the incident if for some reason it did not really engrave itself 
into one’s psyche, but rather it was received as a fairly banal and 
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trivial incident that blends into other weird sights that one takes in 
during the morning commute. 
In light of this complexity, the moral analysis could go something 
like this: generally, bystanders should be allotted wide discretion in 
making the decision of whether or not to engage the scene of a violent 
or life-threatening emergency. Such is not to condone callous 
indifference, but simply to acknowledge the subjective nature of the 
decision and the difficulty of defining bright-line rules for 
engagement. Use of technology, such as taking a cell phone picture, is 
one indication that the bystander has crossed the line—becoming, so to 
say, an “engaged spectator”—directly engaging not only the scene of 
an accident or an assault, but also in some way the vulnerable person. 
However they engage, those who do stop are then morally obliged 
to treat the victim as an end in himself or herself—not as a thing or an 
object, but as a human being. Cell phones may be used to do just that: 
calling for help and recording the attack for a subsequent police 
investigation are both potentially signs of respect for the humanity of 
the victim. Cell phones may also be used as instruments of harm: to 
objectify, humiliate and exploit a victim at his or her most vulnerable 
moment. Those who decide to stop, focus and engage an emergency 
scene, and to use their cell phones to record images of a victim at the 
site of an assault or an accident, have a moral obligation to treat the 




V. THE TORT OBLIGATIONS OF “ENGAGED SPECTATORS” 
In the 1960s, the Kitty Genovese story sparked a national debate 
on the “bystander effect,” and whether there should be a legal duty to 
assist or at least call for help in an emergency situation when there are 
supposedly numerous witnesses.
148
 Should the whole neighborhood 
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have been held responsible? How can one pick out from a crowd the 
individuals who were actually paying attention and focused, and thus 
could have helped in some way? How can one pick out from a crowd 
who should have been able to discern—at a distance, through a closed 
window—the difference between the shouts of a lover’s spat and the 
scream from an attack? At what point in time would everyone have 
been off the hook since one person actually did call the police? The 
Genovese case indicates the complexity of a rush to judgment against 
numerous “pure” bystanders. 
Consider how interactions between bystanders and victims have 
changed with the advent of cell phone technology. First, in many 
instances, at least for a certain set of bystanders, it is no longer a 
question of guessing who might have been paying attention. Breaking 
down the anatomy of a bystander on the street taking a cell phone 
picture or video: the act usually includes stopping and focusing—
psychologically on the event; visually in order to capture the image; 
and technologically, while engaging the media of the recording 
technology. The action also leaves a time and date-stamped recorded 
image, which is also some evidence of one’s visual perspective on the 
event. Captured in digital memory are data that also indicate elements 
such as lighting, proximity, and view. Finally, as mentioned above, a 
cell phone picture is also usually evidence of having in hand the 
requisite technology not only to take a picture, but also to call for help. 
In other words, the act of taking a cell phone picture without using the 
same instrument to dial an emergency number may also reveal a 
choice—to take a picture rather than to call for help. 
In contrast to the time of the Genovese murder, in the Robles case, 
we now have a potential record not only of who among the bystanders 
saw what and when, but also of their potentially deliberate decision to 
treat the incident as a show rather than a traumatic human emergency 
which would have required direct assistance or a call for help. 
The act of taking a cell phone picture can function as a kind of 
sorting mechanism, to separate “pure bystanders”—those who do not 
engage the scene of an accident or assault—from “engaged 
spectators,” those who do engage and focus the scene, and who decide 
not to call for help, notwithstanding that fact that they have the means 
to do so literally in their hands. This Part focuses on the legal 
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obligations of bystanders who decided to engage—or to use John 
Adler’s turn of the phrase—to “venture forth” to encounter the scene 
of a crime or accident, and in so doing, to both objectify and exploit a 
person in need of emergency assistance.
149
 
Daily life in our society presents a number of scenarios in which 
people objectify and exploit each other in some way. An attempt to 
impose tort liability on many of these various harms would be 
unrealistic and undesirable for many reasons. For this reason, the 
proposed tort of “exploitative objectification of a person in need of 
emergency assistance” includes a number of necessary features that 
aim to capture the circumstances in which the coercive force of tort 




A. The Victim is a Vulnerable Person 
In what circumstances might standing on a public sidewalk taking 
a picture of someone constitute a legally cognizable harm under the 
common law of torts? The short answer is: not very many. To draw a 
contrast, the proposed new tort would not encompass taking pictures 
of people in their bathing suits at the beach. Although this form of 
potential objectification may also be problematic and morally wrong, 
for the purposes of this tort analysis, there is an important difference 
between a person who suits up or strips down in order to relax or play 
at the beach and an injured victim of an assault or accident who finds 
him or herself exposed because of an assault or accident. In a way that 
the beachgoer is not, the victim of an assault or accident is 
vulnerable—understood as “open to physical or emotional harm”—
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and generally has no control over the circumstances that brought him 
or her to be splayed out for public visual consumption.
151
 
At the heart of exploitative objectification in these circumstances is 
not so much the image capture itself, but a power dynamic in which 
one who is in control of his or her faculties preys on a person in a 
vulnerable state who is not. It is this interaction between power and 
helplessness that generates the problematic nature of the encounter, 
and that constitutes a specific kind of harm. Photography of both 
subjects (the person in a bathing suit at a public beach, and the victim 
in need of emergency assistance) without consent may result in 
exploitative objectification, and both scenarios may be not only 
distasteful but disturbing. However, I would argue, only the latter 
crosses the line into the kind of harm that should be legally cognizable 
under the rubric of this proposed new tort. 
B. The Objective Need for Emergency Assistance 
Although we live in a world filled with immense need, very few 
people would actually sign up for a life program of unbounded duties 
of self-sacrifice.
152
 There is, however, something extremely 
problematic about venturing forth to encounter a particular person in 
urgent need of assistance, and then doing nothing to help this person. 
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One way to imagine this is as an extreme form of a tease, but the 
circumstances of urgent need make it not only not funny, but cruel. 
How might the concept of “urgent need” help to ground the tort? 
First, the category of the need for emergency assistance works to 
ground the harm in an objective source. Harms that run parallel to 
claims for emotional distress are likely to be met with the skeptical 
assessment that the law should not cater to the feelings of those who 
are super-sensitive to every slight. As John Goldberg and Benjamin 
Zipursky explain, courts hold plaintiffs “to an external standard that, to 
some extent, ignores their particular vulnerabilities.”
153
 To state a 
“wrong” that was inflicted by the defendant, it is important that the 
injury not be the plaintiff’s own responsibility—“for she is using the 




The backdrop of a need for emergency assistance helps to 
distinguish contexts in which one could describe the victim’s harm as 
“self-inflicted.”
155
 Goldberg and Zipursky explain the distinction: 
When a bullet or fist whizzes past someone’s head and 
he or she feels fright, that is an emotional response, but 
it is quite different from the example of the schoolyard 
taunt. The response is visceral, immediate, and 
unthinking. In this context, it makes little sense to hold 
the plaintiff responsible for the response and makes 
much more sense to think of the plaintiff as a victim 
who exercised little or no agency.
156
 
                                                          
153
 John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 Va. L. Rev. 
1625, 1683 (2002). 
154
 Id. at 1683; see generally Erica Goldberg, Emotional Duties, 47 Conn. L. Rev. 
809 (2015). 
155
 I recognize that circumstances such as a suicide attempt would constitute a 
situation in which “urgent need” and self-inflicted harm would coincide. Further 
research could probe a distinction between the initial harm which was self-
inflicted and the shock, fear or panic that may have emerged in the wake of 
unanticipated consequences of that self-inflicted harm. The objective need for 
emergency assistance may flow from the latter. 
156
 Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 153, at 1685-86; cf. Frederick Schauer, The 
Phenomenology of Speech and Harm, 103 Ethics 635, 650 (1993) (examining an 
argument for a distinction between “belief-mediated” and “non-belief-mediated” 
reception of hostile speech, Schauer probes the extent to which responsibility for 
the reaction should be transferred from the inflicter to the victim when the 
 
2017 Crime Spectators and the Tort of Objectification 113 
By limiting the tort to persons in need of emergency assistance, it 
would by definition embrace only those persons who could not be 
reasonably expected to “steel themselves” against the distress of 
exploitative objectification.
157
 In some contexts where people 
experience the harm of objectification it might be reasonable to expect 
that they reframe in some way their perceptions. But a serious or life-
threatening emergency is not one of those contexts. 
Limiting the tort to those in objective need of emergency 
assistance also helps to distinguish situations in which a victim may be 
over-reacting—making a mountain out of a molehill—from situations 




But note also that the tort emphasizes the emergency nature of the 
assistance needed, which should be distinguished from the emergency 
nature of the circumstances which led to such need. Of course 
emergency circumstances (such as an ongoing assault or accident in 
progress) and the need for emergency assistance may coincide, and 
they often do. But the foundation for this tort is a spectator’s exercise 
of discretion in order to deliberately encounter a vulnerable person’s 
urgent need. 
This framework is slightly different from how other theorists 
employ the concept of emergency. Note the function of the category of 
emergency in Ernest Weinrib’s early proposal for an affirmative 
obligation: it is the emergency itself that distinguishes who would be 
required to respond. In the words of Cardozo, “the emergency begets 
the man.”
159
 For Weinrib, it is the unusual circumstances of an 
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emergency that draw lines around what would otherwise be moral or 
social overload, or concerns about fairness in the social distribution of 
resources. Weinrib explains: 
An imminent peril cannot await assistance from the 
appropriate social institutions. The provision of aid to 
an emergency victim does not deplete the social 
resources committed to the alleviation of more routine 
threats to physical integrity. Moreover, aid in such 
circumstances presents no unfairness problems in 
singling out a particular person to receive the aid. 
Similarly, emergency aid does not unfairly single out 
one of a class of routinely advantaged persons; the 
rescuer just happens to find himself for a short period 
in a position, which few if any others share, to render a 
service to some specific person. In addition, when a 
rescue can be accomplished without a significant 
disruption of his own projects, the rescuer’s freedom to 
realize his own ends is not abridged by the duty to 
preserve the physical security of another.
160
 
I share all of these concerns, but stop short of the conclusion that 
the emergency circumstance necessarily defines the contours of the 
bystander’s obligation. Respect for both the decision-making process 
of the bystander, as well as their subjective and personal qualities that, 
notwithstanding the emergency, may render an intervention extremely 
burdensome, lead me to draw a distinction between those who remove 
themselves from the scene and those who decide to engage. 
                                                                                                                                         
is the summons to relief. The law does not ignore these reactions of the mind in 
tracing conduct to its consequences. It recognizes them as normal. It places their 
effects within the range of the natural and probable . . . The risk of rescue, if 
only if be not wanton, is born of the occasion. The emergency begets the man. 
The wrongdoer may not have foreseen the coming of a deliverer. He is 
accountable as if he had.”). 
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One might also query whether distinctions should be drawn 
regarding the nature of the victim’s needs as they relate to the primary 
source of injury, and the timing of the engaged spectator’s encounter 
with the victim. Might the obligation to help be particularly acute 
when the attack or accident is in course and timely assistance could 
mean, for example, the difference between slighter and graver injury, 
or even the prevention of death? Further, when time is of the essence 
and a particular engaged spectator is the only available source of 
potential help, might that element also render an obligation to help 
even more intense? In other words, how might the particular 
circumstances of the injury and timing inform the duty that an engaged 
spectator may have, and the harm that she may cause? 
As discussed above, a bystander’s act of prioritization as made 
manifest in the decision to stop and to focus at the scene of a 
vulnerable victim may or may not align with the objective 
circumstances of an emergency. For example, in the case of Karl Ross, 
the fact that a true emergency was in course—Genovese’s murder—
did not negate the fact that because of his particular anxieties and fears 
he might also have been experiencing a kind of moral overload such 
that it would have been unreasonable to demand of him a specific 
response. 
In contrast to an analysis of circumstances in which “the 
emergency begets the man,” in this analysis, the man is already 
begotten and is a multi-dimensional human being with an interior life 
and decision-making process of his own. This person has certain 
qualities and perhaps also fragilities which may make it difficult or 
impossible to move toward an emergency circumstance. Obligations 
are triggered not because a person “just happens to find himself” in a 
position to render aid,
161
 but because this person has decided to move 
toward the person in these circumstances. 
Particular concerns about how the bystander conducts him or 
herself in the encounter with another human being are contingent on 
the victim’s particular state of vulnerability, due to the need for urgent 
assistance. But within this framework at no point would the 
circumstances of an emergency legally coerce any particular bystander 
to go out of one’s way to engage the situation, or to prioritize the 
victim’s needs over one’s own. However, a bystander’s decision to 
engage the scene indicates that he or she has already “prioritized” his 
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or her time and attention. Once this person has decided to venture forth 
toward an encounter with a vulnerable person in need of emergency 
assistance, at that point the engaged spectator is responsible for 
conducting him or herself in a way that does not objectify the victim in 
an exploitative way. 
C. The Bystander’s Objectification Rises to an “Exploitative” 
Threshold 
Practices and habits of objectification between strangers are 
prevalent in many pockets of urban life. This is true especially in those 
areas of social interaction in which we feel little affective connection 
to the other’s interior life, nor expect to receive anything from a 
connection with the other. Limiting the tort to encounters with a 
vulnerable person in need of emergency assistance helps to keep the 
harm complained of within judicially cognizable limits. 
But the analysis also requires a further sorting mechanism. Even 
when a victim is in need of emergency assistance, pictures or 
recordings may be taken for reasons that foster good citizenship, 
humane concern for the victim, or both. For example, pictures or 
recordings might be submitted to the police in order to initiate or 
further an investigation ultimately aimed at affirming the dignity of the 
person who was injured, as well as furthering the safety of the larger 
community. If on the other hand, pictures were distributed or posted 
on the internet with comments that amount to bullying or trivializing 
the harm, such would be evidence that the intent was to exploit. 
Karen Stohr’s theorization of the moral obligations that emerge 
from a face-to-face encounter with another’s needs adds an important 
dimension. As noted above, Stohr offers an interpretation of Kantian 
beneficence as including not only “the obligation to adopt the wide 
maxim of helping others on occasion,” but also “a narrow duty” which 
prohibits “contempt, arrogance, defamation, and mockery.”
162
 For 
Stohr the duty not to be “indifferent” sometimes translates into an 
obligation to help: “When helping someone is the only way not to be 
indifferent to her, we are required to help.”
163
 
The descriptor “indifference” would seem to register a notch down 
from “exploitative objectification.” It would be fascinating to parse 
whether this might be a case for a hair-line distinction between a 
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narrow duty not to be indifferent to the ends of others—one which is 
always required—and a perfect legally enforceable duty not to exploit 
others. Behavior rising to the level of exploitation seems to hold more 
promise for some kind of external measure of a behavior which 
indicates contempt or mockery. Indifference, on the other hand, seems 
more difficult to measure. For example, when Ross shut the door in the 
face of Genovese’s murder, an outside observer may have interpreted 
that as conveying morally objectionable indifference. Subjectively, 
however, Ross may have been doing his best to manage an impending 
panic attack. Because this Article aims to preserve an ample space of 
respect for the interior of life of the bystander, and the corresponding 
space to exercise the discretion needed to protect this space, the tort 
would require some external manifestation as evidence that the 
conduct rises to the level of being “exploitative.” 
Does the nature of the primary harm make a difference for how an 
engaged bystander’s conduct is assessed? First, for situations arising 
from violence, note that there is a double edge to the analysis of how 
bystanders interact with technology. Assessing the circumstances of 
the attack on Robles outside of the Port Authority, we should be 
concerned not only about the engaged spectators’ failure to call for 
assistance in response to his medical needs, but also the failure of his 
co-citizens to care for the safety of the community as a whole. They 
could have helped to arrest and contain further violence on the part of 
an assailant who had proved himself to be dangerously unstable.
164
 At 
the same time, in several cases photographs and video recordings of 
violence—including violence and abuse of power by the police—have 
proven to be important instruments for citizens not only to contribute 
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Second, it may also be important to distinguish between the types 
of violence that produced the initial harm. For example, when the 
emergency due to violence is sexual assault, as opposed to a robbery 
or another kind of attack, is there something unique about the type of 
harm that engaged spectators may cause? In particular, is there 
something potentially even more disturbing about the exploitative 
nature of the interaction and the bystander’s participation in the event? 
These questions open the door to consideration of whether engaged 
spectators to a sexual assault should simply all be swept into the 
category of vicarious liability for the sexual assault itself, because the 
nature of the harm in this context necessarily renders those taking 
pictures an active and integral part of the attack itself, as participants 
and not merely bystanders.
166
 
D. Face-to-Face Encounters, but Not Contingent on Victim’s 
Immediate or Emotional Response 
The tort hinges on presence on the scene, the encounter between a 
person in need of emergency assistance, and the spectator’s 
exploitative objectification of the victim in this context. One might 
query whether limiting the tort to these circumstances draws a line that 
is too artificial, missing something important about a host of other 
scenarios about which we should also be concerned. To narrow the 
circumstances of this tort to a face-to-face encounter with a victim in 
need of emergency assistance is not to downgrade or marginalize 
broader ethical questions about what is owed to those we do not 
physically encounter. It is simply to submit that direct engagement 
with a person in need of emergency assistance requires a different set 
of moral and legal categories for analysis. 
One might imagine a number of scenarios in which this element is 
absent, but various forms of exploitation are nonetheless present: for 
example, the person who takes pictures of a vulnerable person on the 
scene is not the person who posts them, sells them, or uses them for 
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gain in some explicit way. This tort would draw the line at physical 
presence—and conduct in the encounter with the victim. Depending on 
the nature of the pictures, other torts or regulatory schemes may 
address the question of whether the latter person’s conduct provides 
the foundation for a different tort. 
The distinctions that Judith Lichtenberg draws out in her 
philosophical study of “exploitation” in the context of ethical 
responses to global poverty are especially helpful at this juncture: 
So what is the moral basis for thinking that exploitation 
violates respect while complete neglect does not (or at least 
not necessarily)? One difference follows almost inevitably 
from the fact that two people are in a relationship. Once you 
enter into relations with another person you cannot fail to be 
aware of him and thus in some sense to acknowledge his 
existence; his humanity and his interests come within your 
purview. At least as important is what is implicit in the idea 
of exploitation: taking advantage of another. To take 
advantage of another is to benefit from or even celebrate 
their bad circumstances—even if one does not make them 
worse off than they would have been in the absence of 
interaction—and that seems to amount to using them as a 
means in a way that is objectionable. By contrast, simply to 
fail to aid poor people on the other side of the world is not to 
use them, however else it might be described.
167
 
A second question that emerges from the analysis of a face-to-face 
encounter is whether the tort would be contingent on the immediate 
response of the victim to the experience of exploitative objectification. 
On one hand, one might note the particular acuity of the pain of 
exploitative objectification when coupled with public humiliation. As 
David Luban explains: “The meaning of pain and suffering, their 
communicative content—and therefore the nature of the pain as 
experienced by a being that is sapient as well as sentient—depends on 
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the context in which we experience them.”
168
 The contextual element 
of experiencing intense vulnerability against the backdrop of 
bystanders not only ignoring one’s urgent needs, but preying on the 
spectacle as a source of curiosity or entertainment, might be 
characterized as a unique dimension of the particular harm. As Luban 
notes: “The world of intense pain is a world in which we are incredibly 
diminished . . . This is degrading in itself, but when it happens in front 
of spectators, the experience is doubly shameful and humiliating.”
169
 
But that said, the tort would not hinge on the immediate response 
or reaction of the victim to exploitative objectification and humiliation. 
In contrast to the varying versions of the tort of infliction of emotional 
distress, this tort defines “exploitative objectification” of a person in 
need of emergency assistance as a wrong in and of itself, regardless of 
the immediate reaction or response of the victim. 
Probing the question of whether the standard for humiliation is 
objective and universal, or subjective and victim-relative, Luban 
considers an example of an interaction when the victim is physically 
unconscious: 
A student drinks too much at a party and passes out. 
Some malicious wiseacres proceed to undress her and 
exhibit her naked body to everyone at the party—
friends, acquaintances, dormmates and strangers. Then 
they put her clothes back on, and when she wakes up 
and sobers up, nobody tells her what happened.
170
 
Luban draws out an objective standard for humiliation, even if, in a 
case like this, the victim “never finds out and never has any subjective 
experience of humiliation.”
171
 Along similar lines, I would argue that 
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the harm of exploitative objectification of a person in need of 
assistance can be measured objectively, as a wrong in and of itself, 
regardless of the victim’s actual awareness or response. In other 
words, the harm as articulated in this tort could encompass not only a 
face-to-face encounter, but also a “face-to-body” encounter, where, for 
example, the victim was drugged or unconscious such that he or she 
was not aware of the humiliation of his or her person at the time. 
E. Use of Technology is Evidence, Not a Required Element of 
the Tort 
Would the harm necessarily be limited to bystanders using 
recording devices? Theoretically, no. Recall the earlier discussions 
regarding the extent to which cruel objectification was the driver for 
moral outrage expressed in response to Bentham’s example of the man 
with water at hand laughing at the lady with the headdress on fire,
172
 
Prosser’s image of the man on the dock coolly smoking a cigarette 
while another person drowns before his eyes,
173
 and, of course, the 
Seinfeld characters “mocking and maligning” the robbery victim.
174
 
These could exemplify the harm of “exploitative objectification.” 
Practically, however, the snap of a cell phone picture, especially 
when unaccompanied by any sign of effort to help or to recognize in 
some way the gravity of the harm and the subjective experience of the 
victim’s trauma, may make the tort case much easier to prove. The 
Seinfeld scene of recording the robbery is a good example of how the 
use of technology may be parsed. Note how the operation of the 
technology was distributed among the characters: only Kramer has a 
video camera in hand; and only Jerry has a mobile phone (in the late 
1990s, a means to call for help) in hand. Yet all four participate in the 
“mocking and maligning” of the victim of assault and robbery. 
Technology in the hand of one character (Kramer) fixes the attention 
and the gaze of all four, and all four engage the scene as a source of 
sarcastic entertainment. 
Note also that the tort does not hinge only on how the images or 
recordings are used. The use of the technology is indicative of intent. 
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The tort itself focuses on the conduct of the bystander when face-to-
face with a victim in need of emergency assistance. For example, 
Kramer’s video also includes a recording of their “mocking and 
maligning,” and utter indifference to the victim’s need for assistance. 
Regardless of whether the video was subsequently posted or marketed 
in some way, the content of the video contains proof of the characters’ 
exploitative intent—that Kramer and the others were engaging the 
scene for the satisfaction of their curiosity or sarcastic pleasure. 
At the same time, how the images or recordings were used may be 
important evidence for a defense. In this regard, the pleadings and 
evidentiary implications are as follows: 
1. Any time an engaged spectator chooses to photograph a vulnerable 
person in need of emergency assistance, it is presumptively an 
exploitative objectification. 
2. It is a complete defense for the spectator to show a) that the photograph 
or recording was being taken for a benign reason (e.g., to provide 
evidence for a police investigation of the accident or assault); and b) that 
the photograph or recording was not used in an objectifying way (e.g., 
posted on social media accompanied by sarcastic comments). 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Like many people, I have been disturbed by reports of what seems 
to be indifference on the part of bystanders to the needs of persons in 
need of emergency assistance whom they physically encounter. At the 
same time, I remain unconvinced by the breadth of some arguments 
that bystanders should have affirmative moral or legal obligations to 
assist or call for help simply by virtue of their circumstantial presence 
on the scene. This Article proposes a more fine-tuned assessment of 
moral and legal obligations that appreciates the multi-layered and 
subjective nature of a bystander’s encounter with a trauma or an act of 
violence that this person has not caused nor exacerbated. On this basis, 
I propose a distinction between “pure bystanders” and “engaged 
spectators.” 
Much as we would all like to think of ourselves as potential heroes, 
in situations of violence, shock, and trauma, many of us would be 
bumbling bundles of nerves and emotions, conditioned by fears and 
perhaps also blocked by a sense of paralysis and uncertainty that 
impedes a helpful response. Because people often need discretionary 
space to work through their response to violence or trauma, we should 
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also go easy on that leap toward “there ought to be a law” that dictates 
exactly what should be done and by whom in an emergency situation. 
For a host of reasons, some of which have been explored above, 
the people whom I describe as “pure bystanders” may choose not to 
engage the scene. I make no claim about the morality of their choice. 
Or better, my argument also allows space for strong moral 
condemnation. Nonetheless, I also argue that this category of 
bystanders should not be legally coerced to intervene because I believe 
the law lacks the fine-tuned instruments needed to probe the interior 
life of bystanders which shapes the contours of their choices. 
However, when an onlooker directly engages the scene and the 
victim, this person crosses an objective line. Once that line has been 
crossed, I argue that the person has entered into a territory in which 
legal obligations should attach. The line consists of a visible 
manifestation of engagement with the victim in need of emergency 
assistance. Bystanders may pass by the scene of a victim in need for 
many reasons, including shock, fear, indifference, hurry, or simply 
because one was not paying attention. But those who stop to engage 
the scene in order to watch and observe may indicate by their very 
stopping that they are not afraid, they are not in so much of a hurry, 
and they are paying attention to the scene. 
Until recently, it was difficult to determine exactly who had 
crossed that line into engagement with the scene and with the victim. 
Now many spectators have in hand an instrument—a cell phone 
camera—through which they can take pictures that document their 
presence, thus serving as evidence of engagement, focus, and in some 
circumstances, intentions. 
The proposed tort of “exploitative objectification of a person in 
need of emergency assistance” reflects an effort to define the 
obligation that an engaged spectator—one who has in the context of an 
emergency made a decision to engage a vulnerable person—owes to 
this fellow human being. The tort also crystallizes the distinct harm 
that this person inflicts with objectifying conduct, such as taking a cell 
phone picture instead of calling for help or helping. 
By naming and defining the shape of a tort duty—and so clarifying 
that under certain circumstances strangers can and do inflict emotional 
and dignitary harm on each other—and by delineating the nature of the 
distinct harm that “exploitative objectification” may cause in certain 
circumstances, this Article stands as an invitation to explore further the 
nature of these encounters, and the scope of what we owe to each other 
simply by virtue of the nature of our common humanity. 
